# Case Neg Russia

## Provinces CP

### 1NC Counterplan

#### text – the 85 provinces in the Russian Federation ought to require employers to pay a living wage.

#### 2 net benefits: Russian federalism

#### Spending DA – link is national minimum wage increases

### 1NC Russian Federalism

#### Russian federalism is on the brink. Overreaches of federal authority threaten to undermine the entire structure – clashes over federalism are coming now

Krasheninnikov 14 [(Fyodor, author for Moscow times) “Russia Can't Ignore Federalism Forever” Moscow Times Sep 01, 2014] AT

The recent torrent of perverse Kremlin propaganda has tarnished the worthy concept of federalism. First, the Russian government turned it into "federalization" and began persecuting a neighboring country with it. They began calling the pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine "armed supporters of federalization," turning what had been an absurd political vaudeville act into a full-scale bloody drama, simultaneously eclipsing the growing domestic debate over federalism as it applies to Russia. In fact, federalism is a burning issue in Russia, however much national leaders and their loyal local elites pretend that the problem does not exist. Vast areas of Russia are poorly governed: The Kremlin often haphazardly appoints local officials based solely on their absolute loyalty to the federal center and their willingness to sacrifice local interests at the first sign from the top. In most cases, the power vertical extends all the way down to the municipal level, with the result that, whenever the occasion demands, even the interests of major cities are also easily sacrificed to the Kremlin's short-term interests. Unfortunately, Russia's current model of political authority precludes the existence of any local interests, rights or meaningful local government whenever the federal center feels its interests are at risk. The Kremlin makes exceptions for several national regions like Chechnya, but that only exacerbates the problem. In turns out that the authorities grant special rights and preferences not for good behavior but for bad, thereby dangerously undermining the entire state structure. There is no forum in Russia for discussing federalism, nobody to discuss it with, and very real danger for anyone who tries. In fact, the people who should have a vital interest in federalism make every effort to avoid the topic because they know the authorities will respond quickly and cruelly if they make any attempt to discuss an expansion of their rights. The collective silence of local elites does not signify their solidarity with the Kremlin as is commonly believed. It is simply a sign of the universal fear that prompts people to sacrifice even their most pressing interests for the sake of career, wealth and personal freedom. But Russia is too large and has too many problems for this situation to last forever. This country will inevitably have to engage in a serious discussion of federalism at some point.

#### Conditions for breakthroughs in regional diversity are in place – the counterplan’s use of unified regional action independent of central government policy allows an effective system of Russian federalism to emerge, whereas the plan would crush federalism

Makarychev 9 [(Andrey Makarychev, Nizhny Novgorod Civil Service Academy) “New Challenges to Russian Federalism” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 75] AT

President Medvedev has to manage increasing levels of regional diversity, fragmentation, and asymmetry in Russia, manifested in spheres of identity, economics, and security. It is quite feasible that, under certain circumstances, claims for greater autonomy and diversification will be formulated in ways that more directly challenge the existing balance of power between federal and regional governments. In times of crisis, regional publics will likely increase pressure on the federal center, demanding more managerial efficiency and economic justice. Even so-called donor regions – the wealthiest of the regions - have started to tacitly complain about their deteriorating financial conditions. The Kremlin does not oppose the recognition of a variety of regional identities and interests. For instance, the three most recent Russia–EU summits were held outside of Moscow: in Samara, which could have been interpreted as a confirmation of this region’s importance in terms of promoting its European credentials; Khanty-Mansiisk, a city representative of Russia’s vast energy resources and one of the country’s strongest bargaining cards in its relations with Europe; and Khabarovsk, an overt allusion to Russia’s potential to position itself within the Asia-Pacific and Far Eastern context. In some cases, Moscow even seems to be favorably disposed to the geo-cultural ambitions of certain regions. Ekaterinburg, a city promoting itself as Russia’s “Eurasian capital,” hosted both the BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits. Moscow is equally supportive of regional participation in Finno-Ugrian networking projects (linking some Russian regions to Finland and Hungary) as a possible pathway for Russian integration with Europe. As Medvedev puts his own stamp on regional policy, it is difficult to say whether a more decentralized type of federalism will emerge. He has disavowed the importance of merging smaller regions into wider federal units, a strategy that was a meaningful element of Putin’s concept of effective federalism. He has also questioned the practicality of transferring certain administrative functions from Moscow to other large cities, an idea that has been bandied about for more than a decade. In the nearest future, it is conceivable that the Kremlin will have to rely upon the regions with the strongest potential, basically measured in terms of managerial efficiency, and thus look for the best practices and models of regional governance. This could mean sending a message to regions, compelling them to acknowledge that the Kremlin is not the only source of development assistance in Russia and that strong local leadership is necessary for the country’s modernization. It is clear that Medvedev wishes to keep open as many administrative channels as possible in order to influence the appointment of new chief executives in the regions. These include the party mechanisms of United Russia, the ruling party; the so-called “presidential reserve” of reliable regional managers; and political nominations based upon informal bargaining rather than administrative procedures. What is less certain is how the inevitable regional diversification of the country can be reconciled with the still unified style of governance practiced by the “party of power” in the Kremlin. As for the regions themselves, the key problem is that most of them are investing heavily in forging singular identities at the expense of promoting collective regional action and coalition-building. The resulting disjointed regionalism is as vulnerable to the assertion of central hegemony as it was a decade ago. Only regional collective action could truly challenge the re-centralization policies of the Kremlin, yet this perspective remains as remote as it was when Russian federalism made its first steps almost twenty years ago.

#### Excessive reliance on central authority undermines Russian federalism, and political culture is becoming tolerant of local authority, which the plan would crush. Only the counterplan reclaims the federal model.

Kempton 1 [(Daniel, associate professor and chair at the Department of Political Science at Northern Illiois University) “Russian federalism: Continuing myth or political salvation”] AT

Leonid Smyrnygin, Yeltsin's former regional specialist, complained that Russia's centralization "engenders many disappointing defects in the political culture of the Russian people, such as the habit of seeing `real authority' only in the leadership of Moscow, making it responsible for everything, and resigning oneself to the tyranny of local authorities."85 Similarly, as Midkhat Farukshine argues, the aspects of Russian culture that work against federalism include not only a limited democratic tradition, but "a centuries old tradition of rigid bureaucratic centralized decision making"86 Yet there is evidence that Russian political culture is becoming more tolerant of multiple loyalties. A recent study of Russian center-periphery relations found that in all six of the subekty analyzed there was significant support for greater local control over economic resources and policy.87 Yet in five of the six subekty-Chechnya was the obvious exception- there was no tangible support for a break with the Russian Federation. In short, although people are generally disillusioned with government in general, the people of the Russian Federation appear to be developing an attachment to local government and its importance without abandoning their commitment lo the Russian state. Even in Sakha and Tatarstan, both of which are led by non-Russian presidenta, any support for independence that once existed has waned. If nothing else, citizens of the Russian Federation now particípate ¡in electing both subekt and national officials and expect returns from both levels of government. This dual identity is still developing in Russia, but it may engender support for federalism in the long term.

#### Russian federalism key to Russian stability

Kempton 1 [(Daniel, associate professor and chair at the Department of Political Science at Northern Illiois University) “Russian federalism: Continuing myth or political salvation”] AT

Russia's choice of federalism was not unusual. A century ago, federalism was seen as a weak and inherently temporary form of government. English constitutional authorities such as Lord Bryce characterized federalism as "no more than a transitory step on the way to constitutional-governmental unity." 1 In the 1930s, Laski saw federalism as a pragmatic but temporary way for Britain and other colonial authorities to shift power to more local authorities within their empires. Friedrich believed the process more frequently moved in the opposite direction, but portrayed federalism in a similar fashion. Federalism arose when a group of previously autonomous states, typically driven by the defense imperative, formed a single central government. All three saw federalism as a transitory step rather than as an end goal. 2 Today, however, federalism is considered the hallmark of a stable, diverse state. It is a feature of many modern democracies including Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. It has been adopted to manage ethnic and religious tension in Canada, Belgium, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Spain, and South Africa. Federalism has become fashionable because of its perceived benefits. It can accommodate diverse minority groups within a single state. Federalism provides religious, ethnic, and cultural minority groups with a safe political base in which they can control cultural and educational policies. Second, by giving multiple minorities an entrenched political base federalism can promote pluralism and thus democracy. Third, as with early federations and leagues, the component regions receive the benefits of common defense without fully sacrificing their autonomy to the center. Fourth, like members of a free market area, the components of a federal system receive the benefits of a common market without fully surrendering economic autonomy. Finally, because federalism is based on the assumption of continual negotiation and renegotiation--among the components and between the components and the center--it provides a highly adaptable and flexible form of government. If federalism can provide even a few of those benefits to contemporary Russia, it may well prove to be Russia's political salvation. It may explain Russia's survival. The question, then, is whether federalism is Russia's political salvation or merely a continuing myth?

#### The impact is miscalculated nuclear war against the US. Deterrence doesn’t apply.

Pry 99 Ph.D., formerly with the CIA, is currently a professional military advisor to the U.S. House of Representatives on national security issues, ‘99 (Peter Vincent Pry, War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink, p. 274) Bankey

Russian internal troubles—such as a leadership crisis, coup, or civil war—could aggravate Russia’s fears of foreign aggression and lead to a miscalculation of U.S. intentions and to nuclear overreaction. While this may sound like a complicated and improbable chain of events, Russia’s story in the 1990s is one long series of domestic crises that have all too often been the source of nuclear close calls. The war scares of August 1991 and October 1993 arose out of coup attempts. The civil war in Chechnya caused a leadership crisis in Moscow, which contributed to the nuclear false alarm during Norway’s launch of a meteorological rocket in January 1995. Nuclear war arising from Russian domestic crises is a threat the West did not face, or at least faced to a much lesser extent, during the Cold War. The Russian military's continued fixation on surprise-attack scenarios into the 1990s, combined with Russia's deepening internal problems, has created a situation in which the United States might find itself the victim of a preemptive strike for no other reason than a war scare born of Russian domestic troubles. At least in nuclear confrontations of the 1950s-1970s during the Berlin crisis, Cuban missile crisis, and 1973 Middle East war—both sides knew they were on the nuclear brink. There was opportunity to avoid conflict through negotiation or deescalation. The nuclear war scares of the 1980s and 1990s have been one-sided Russian affairs, with the West ignorant that it was in grave peril.

### 2NR Federalism Link Wall

#### The plan’s imposition of the federal policy agenda on the provinces kills democratic legitimacy

Kinossian 12 [(Nadir, University of Tromso) “Mega-Projects as a Solution to the Challenges Facing Russia's Arctic Cities”] AT

The ‘policy palette’ of the federal government is based on a selective use of western models, such as development corporations, special economic zones, economic clusters and innovation centers. These arrangements have not been a result of devolution of power to regions but a direct intervention of the central authorities at the regional and local levels, sometimes with little awareness about local conditions. As these policy arrangements are often ‘immune’ to public scrutiny, they raise questions about their environmental impact, long-term durability, and the ability to deliver economic development. Mega-projects create a new geography and scalar structure of the country. The ‘hot spots’, such as Skolkovo, urban agglomerations, and in fact, the whole Arctic zone are governed through special regimes aimed to stimulate investment, economic productivity and remove “unnecessary” bureaucratic restrictions that inhibit the flow of capital, ideas and goods. At the same time, democratic legitimacy and the long-term environmental impact of new spatial governance arrangements need to be carefully analyzed.

#### This is a core area of conflict now – battles between centralized and non-centralized forms of government will determine the future of federalism in Russia

Kempton 1 [(Daniel, associate professor and chair at the Department of Political Science at Northern Illiois University) “Russian federalism: Continuing myth or political salvation”] AT

A highly centralized bureaucracy is inimical to federalism because it provides a powerful tool for the center to control the policies of the component governments. The Soviet Union maintained the archetypal centralized bureaucracy: All roads led to Moscow, and all bureaucratic decisions passed through Moscow. If an auto plant in Tatarstan needed fuel from a refinery in neighboring Bashkortostan, the decision-and sometimes even the oil-had to go through Moscow. When the Soviet Union collapsed, control of the huge Soviet bureaucracy in the subekty was up for grabs. The practical effect of the subekty's grabs for sovereignty in the first two institutional stages was that many subekty took control of and responsibility for bureaucracies based in their territories. Sakha and Tatarstan are the most extreme examples. Both received the right to control the expenditure of federal taxes spent by federal agencies in their territories. Ultimately, however, many of the concessions were taken back. The center is acting more decisively to maintain control of the bureaucracy. In 1998, for example, it intervened to stop a referendum that-if passed-would have transferred control of the procuracy in the Ingush republic to the republican government. Nonetheless, the Russian economic collapse of 1998 left the federal government unable to cover the needs of many of its ministries, and the subekty that were willing and able to provide resources to the ministries gained considerable influence over them. Clearly, control of the Russian bureaucracy is still an area of considerable political conflict. However, it is equally clear that the Russian bureaucracy today is considerably less centralized than it was a decade ago

### A2 Kempton goes aff

#### Kempton definitely negates – here’s the conclusion from his article

Kempton 1 [(Daniel, associate professor and chair at the Department of Political Science at Northern Illiois University) “Russian federalism: Continuing myth or political salvation”] AT

Whatever conclusions we draw about the success of federalism in Russia must be tentative because Russia remains in a state of considerable flux. The most obvious conclusion is that the Russian Federation, as the name implies, is a functioning federal system. The most basic definition of a federal system is "self-rule plus shared rule ""' Russia today possesses at least two levels of government, each of which has meaningful autonomy on certain issues. That is an important and remarkable change from a decade ago. At the lame time, as specified in the constitution, there are many issues over which Russia's component governments and federal government share power. The shared governance inherent in federalism has given Russia highly conflictual center-periphery relations. That is neither surprising nor decisive. Federalism is a system designed not to eliminate center-periphery conflict, but to channel it. With the notable exception of Chechnya, federalism has helped to channel Russian center-periphery relations into the spheres of political struggle and negotiation. Will Russia be a successful federal system? Although answering this question is presently beyond the means of academics, my preliminary survey provides some evidence that Russia has created or acquired many of the attributes that could make it a successful federal system. Those attributes remain extremely underdeveloped compared to other federal systems. Whether Russia's progress will be sufficient is yet to be determined.

## Spending Disad

### 1NC Spending

#### Any increase in minimum wage makes Russian spending go way up

Wilson 5 [Josh Wilson, “Russian Labor: Workers' Stories A Sociological Glimpse at Moscow's Working Population,” School of Russian and Asian Studies] AZ

Her sister, who is an official employee, also could not turn to any government agency if she wished to complain about her 98-hour workweek. She is officially a manager by contract, entrusted to hire employees to work shifts. That she works more hours than legally required would be considered her own fault as a manager. Furthermore, since minimum wage in Russia is only 720 rubles ($26) a month, the 300 rubles a day that she is given is technically enough to hire some 12 people to staff the counter. The minimum wage, incidentally, remains low despite the fact that the government itself has calculated the official subsistance level to be more than three times that amount, at 5512 rubles ($187) a month, and most international agencies consider the official estimate low. But government wages are calculated as multiples of the minimum wage, so any increase causes government expenses to go up exponentially.

#### Overspending causes economic collapse—sanctions, low oil prices, and deficit spending make Russia especially vulnerable

Flintoff 12/3 [Corey Flintoff, “Russia Heads Toward Recession, With No Relief In Sight,” NPR. 12/3/14] AZ

Russia's economy has taken a series of heavy hits in the past few months, and now it seems to be in the midst of a perfect storm. The country depends heavily on oil exports, and prices are down sharply. The Russian currency is losing value fast. And U.S. and European sanctions, imposed after Russia's takeover of Crimea, are biting hard. President Vladimir Putin remains defiant, saying sanctions will never bring Russia to its knees. But the pain is real. Russia's [Economic Development Ministry](http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/russia-will-hit-recession-in-2015-because-of-oil-and-ukraine-kremlin-admits-1.2857186" \t "_blank) said Tuesday that economic growth for 2015, which had been forecast at an anemic 1.2, has been revised downward and the economy is now expected to contract by 0.8 percent next year. Here are some answers to key questions facing the Russian economy: Why are falling oil prices having such a negative impact on Russia? Russia is not the only country heavily dependent on revenues from its oil and gas exports. But some of the others, like Saudi Arabia, have deeper pockets in the form of huge reserves of dollars and euros that can be used to pay its bills when the oil income tapers off. Economists say Russia needs a world oil price of around $100 a barrel to fund its government spending. When the price falls below that mark, Russia either has to curb spending or run a deficit. Oil prices began falling sharply this summer and are currently about $71 a barrel. Normally, a little deficit spending shouldn't hurt Russia, a country that doesn't have a lot of foreign debt. But Russia has a lot of demands on its budget right now, including a massive military buildup and support for banks and businesses that are feeling the effects of Western sanctions. How much are the U.S. and European sanctions contributing to Russia's current problems? Russia's finance minister said recently that sanctions will cost Russia about $40 billion in lost economic activity if they're extended through next year. The biggest problem is that the sanctions make it very hard for Russian banks to obtain foreign capital, and for Russian companies to borrow money to finance their operations. Those banks and the state-owned energy companies are now asking the government to give them money from its reserve funds. For instance, Rosneft, the big state oil company, is asking for $42 billion. That money would come from Russia's National Wealth Fund, which was originally created to guarantee pensions.

#### Extinction

Filger, columnist and founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, 09

(Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction, www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html)

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consesquences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### Brink – Russia Econ

#### Russia’s economy is on the brink now---nat gas exports are key

Moscow Times 9/15/14, news outlet in Russia, September 15, “Russia Shouldn't Expect a Prosperous Future,” <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-shouldn-t-expect-a-prosperous-future/507114.html>

Russia's economic future is cloudy, at best. There was a time, not long ago, when Russia was one of the fastest-growing economies globally. In constant dollar terms, Russia grew twice as fast as China in the 2000s. As an export market, Russia expanded by up to 30 percent annually, much faster than any other major economy. But those times will not return. This is in part due to the world economy, and in part due to Russia's domestic issues. The world economy is evidently entering a lower growth period, after decades of prosperity unique from a historical point of view. To a degree this is due to the financial crisis. Excessive debt levels have to be normalized and so finance will be tighter. More and more countries are also going through a demographic transition. The U.S. population is growing slowly, Europe's population is holding steady, and China will soon be facing not only an aging, but also a declining population. Europe's long-term expected growth is almost stagnant, while the U.S.'s is at best 2 percent annually. China will continue catching up with the rich countries, but Russia won't gain much as it produces little that the Chinese bourgeoisie demands. But, even given the worsening global outlook, Russia has seriously damaged its potential for fast growth by failing to pursue meaningful economic reform, especially since 2011. It's true, of course, that many existing policy challenges are complicated and lack obvious solutions. But the government's avoidance of reform is not due to lack of expert understanding. Rather, it is due to the Kremlin's weak hold on power, which forces it to make impossible promises of more money for everybody. The military, pensioners, public sector employees and other worthy causes have all been promised more resources out of the same, limited pot. Even under normal circumstances, this is a highly risky tactic to adopt. The notorious prestige projects of the Winter Olympics and the World Cup are a highly visible consequence of this overly liberal spending. And to make matters worse, some of the promises have even been extended abroad. Although Crimea is a relatively small place and therefore probably economically sustainable, eastern Ukraine's moribund industries are not. Even if Donbass remains within Ukraine, Russia has de facto promised to help it survive economically. The European Union has made a similar promise concerning Ukraine, but has hugely greater economic resources than Moscow. Russia can rely on its natural resources to fund such outlays, but this may prove dangerous: In the foreseeable future energy will remain

### Accidental Launch Impact

#### Russia’s deteriorating infrastructure risks accidental war – economic decline accelerates the deterioration

Hacket 1 [(James, contributing writer to The Washington Times) “Accident Launch Wake-Up Call” WASHINGTON TIMES 6-20-2001] AT

Twice in the past month accidents involving Russian missiles and missile warning systems have served to remind us that the possibility of a nuclear accident still exists. In the most recent incident a surface-to-air missile complex in the Moscow region's Ramenskoye district exploded on June 8, destroying three S-300 missile launchers and 12 missiles. Eyewitnesses said they saw what appeared to be a missile launch following the explosion and Moscow television reported two missiles were launched. But a Russian Air Force spokesman said there were no launches. Whether a missile was launched or not, one or more might have been. A short-circuit in a missile engine is believed to have caused the explosion and resulting fire. Windows were broken in a nearby town, where witnesses said they counted six loud explosions and saw a mushroom cloud rising over the forest. But it was not a nuclear explosion - these missiles normally are not nuclear-armed. The S-300 is Russia's counterpart to America's Patriot, a solid-fuel missile designed to intercept aircraft, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles. It is in widespread service in Russia, and Moscow is eagerly trying to sell it abroad. Less than a month earlier, on May 10, a major fire broke out at a mission control center of Russia's military space forces near Kurilovo, some 60 miles southwest of Moscow, causing a loss of contact with four military satellites. The fire, reportedly caused by a short-circuit in a power cable, broke out at 2:30 in the morning and was so severe that the three-story command center was still burning at noon. The function of the military satellites that were out of service was not reported. Whether missile early warning satellites or military communications satellites, they could play an important role in Russia's ability to maintain control of its nuclear missiles. Remember 1995, when a sounding rocket launched from Norway caused Russian nuclear missile forces to go on alert and President Boris Yeltsin's nuclear briefcase was activated, ready to launch a missile attack on the U.S? Even a brief, unexpected interruption in the functioning of Moscow's early warning satellites could be dangerous. These two recent incidents are only the latest in a string of accidents that reflect Russia's declining infrastructure, diminishing military effectiveness, and lack of funds. Last August, the explosion and sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine was followed by a major fire in the Ostankino TV tower that knocked out Moscow television. With infrastructure that has not been modernized for 20 to 30 years, more disasters are waiting to happen. The Russian economy has been buoyed this year by the high price of oil on the world market, but the next downturn in price could produce an acceleration of Russia's infrastructure decline. Last year an article in the paper Komsomolskaya Pravda claimed that the unnatural Soviet economy had forced technological expansion beyond the country's means. Now, with few resources to modernize the aging infrastructure the chance of a nuclear disaster or crisis involving Russia's huge stockpile of nuclear weapons will increase. All of Russia's intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missiles, except for the 26 new SS-27s produced over the past three years, will be obsolete by 2010 and should be retired. Since Russia is not an enemy, there has been a tendency to forget its nuclear-armed missiles. The main reason for a national missile defense is to prevent missile-armed countries from using their weapons to blackmail or intimidate, and to stop any missile that a rogue state may launch. But another important reason is to stop an accidental or unauthorized launch from any country. The main concern in this regard has to be the 736 intercontinental ballistic missiles and hundreds of submarine-launched missiles still operational in Russia and carrying some 6,000 aging nuclear warheads. The decline of Russia's command and control network, with equipment that tends to have "short-circuits," is\_ sending us a warning.

#### Accidental launch causes nuclear war

Wickersham 9 [“Confronting Nuclear War: The Role of Education, Religion, and the Community”. Professor of Peace Studies at Michigan State University, Wickersham is part of the eight-member Missouri University Nuclear Disarmament Education Team, which he helped found in 2009. Their mission is to enlighten Missouri and the rest of the world about the need to abolish nuclear war weapons from the planet through discussions and presentations to interested groups.] AT

Currently, there are over 23,000 nuclear weapons in the world—a total of over 100,000 Hiroshima bombs or 7000 megatons of TNT. At its peak in 1964, the U.S. alone had the equivalent of 17,000 megatons. For perspective, all of the bombs dropped during WWII totaled only 3 megatons, which is about ten average-sized strategic nuclear weapons. Combined, the U.S. and Russia possess over 97 percent of these weapons. Of which, about 3,500 remain on high alert status and are ready to be launched in minutes. In a time of crisis or perceived attack, the Russian and U.S. presidents have three and eight minutes, respectively, to make a decision to order an attack against each other. Thus, a single miscalculation or computer error could lead to nuclear war (see table in appendix). Political leaders have taken elaborate steps to comfort these fears. However, the mere existence of these weapons maintains the possibility of an unpredicted sequence of events leading to its use.

## Informal Sector Disad

### 1NC Informal Sector

#### Increasing minimum wage transfers people to informal sector – turns case

Muravyev and Oshchepkov 13 [Alexander Muravyev and Aleksey Oshchepkov, Senior Research Associates. “Minimum Wages, Unemployment and Informality: Evidence from Panel Data on Russian Regions”, Institute for the Study of Labor, December 2013] AZ

Our results suggest an adverse effect of the minimum wage on young workers in the form of higher unemployment among those aged 16 to 24. In contrasts, we find no evidence of disemployment effects of the minimum wage for workers aged 25 to 72. These results are in line with the bulk of the previous empirical literature that suggests significant negative consequences of the minimum wage for most vulnerable groups in the labor market, but insignificant effects for the working age population in general. Another result of our study is related to the effect of minimum wages on informal employment. We find that minimum wage hikes lead to an increase in the share of workers employed in the informal sector. This may imply relocation of workers from the formal sector to the informal one as a consequence of minimum wage increases, which is consistent with the observed high inter-sectoral mobility (e.g., Bosh and Maloney, 2010; Lehmann et al., 2012). These findings, therefore, cast doubt on the effectiveness of minimum wages in promoting income equity and reducing the minimum wage. For example, in November 2007 the Vologda region raised the local minimum to 3,300 Rubles (43.5% above the level stipulated in federal law, which was 2,300 Rubles at the time), and this change was introduced retroactively from September 01, 2007. Similarly, the elevation of the minimum wage in St. Petersburg to 6,200 Rubles (43.2 percent above the federal minimum, which was 4,330 Rubles) from January 01, 2009 was introduced by the local government retroactively on February 13, 2009. An important implication is that firms were in most cases restricted in the opportunity to adjust employment levels in advance, before minimum wage hikes taking effect.

#### Rights abuses and labor protections are nonexistent in the informal sector – it’s as bad as unemployment or worse, which is a magnifier for my impacts

#### Turns case since vulnerable workers lose their jobs

### More Link Ev

#### Prefer comprehensive data

Muravyev and Oshchepkov 13 [Alexander Muravyev and Aleksey Oshchepkov, Senior Research Associates. “Minimum Wages, Unemployment and Informality: Evidence from Panel Data on Russian Regions”, Institute for the Study of Labor, December 2013] AZ

Next, we drop from the sample regions with weak labor markets. The results stay qualitatively the same as above. The minimum wage is associated with youth unemployment and informal employment. These results are significant both statistically and economically. One percentage point increase in the minimum wage is associated with 0.11 percentage points increase in youth unemployment and 0.08 percentage points increase in informal employment. Finally, we check whether our key results are sensitive to introducing weights that capture different sizes of Russian regions in terms of population. In particular, while several regions have over 5 million inhabitants, some have less than 0.25 million people. The results, which are reported at the foot of Table 4, confirm the previously reported pattern. Minimum wage hikes increase informal employment and youth unemployment. We conclude that our main findings survive a battery of robustness checks.

#### Drastic minimum wage jumps especially harm Russian economy—forces informal sector

Muravyev and Oshchepkov 13 [Alexander Muravyev and Aleksey Oshchepkov, Senior Research Associates. “Minimum Wages, Unemployment and Informality: Evidence from Panel Data on Russian Regions”, Institute for the Study of Labor, December 2013] AZ

The Russian case is particularly interesting due to the unusually high magnitudes of minimum wage increases, approaching 100 percent in several cases. The dataset at our disposal, collected from various official sources, contains quarterly observations of minimum wages and labor market outcomes in 89 regions of Russia over 10 years, 2001 to 2010. Based on fixed-effects regressions, we find considerable evidence of adverse effects of the minimum wage on the labor market. In particular, minimum wage hikes are associated with increased youth unemployment and increased informality. In contrast, there is no evidence of the disemployment effect of the minimum wage for workers aged 25-72. These findings are consistent with many previous studies, for both developed and developing economies, such as (Neumark and Wascher 2008; Nataraj et al. 2013). We also find that the adjustment of the Russian labor market to minimum wage increases seems to occur fairly quickly, within a quarter following the increases. There is no evidence of advance reaction of employers to minimum wage hikes. 19 19 Overall, our analysis supports the viewpoint that the minimum wage is a problematic policy instrument to tackle poverty and inequality. Instead of promoting greater income equality and reducing poverty, it seems to increase unemployment among the youth and force workers to take informal jobs, which are typically associated with lower job security, lower earnings, and a lack of social security protection.

#### Informal sector turns the aff on a systemic level—people in the informal sector face low job security and a lower quality of life

#### Most disadvantaged most vulnerable to informal employment

Lehmann and Zaiceva 13 [Hartmut Lehmann and Anzelika Zaiceva, “INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT IN RUSSIA: DEFINITIONS, INCIDENCE, DETERMINANTS AND LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 12/4/13] AZ

Using the regular waves of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for the years 2003 to 2011 and a supplement on informality administered to the RLMS in 2009 we document the incidence of informal employment in the Russian labour market. The incidence varies widely according to the measure of employment used, with dependent informal employment lying between roughly 7 and 20% of all employees and informal self-employment having a minimum value of 45% and a maximum value of 73% of all self-employed. We also call employment informal if in the formal sector firms do only declare a part of wages to the authorities and thus do not pay all the due taxes or the social security contributions to the government. We show that this type of informal employment is widespread in the Russian labour market, hovering around 20% for dependent employees and reaching roughly 50% for the self-employed. Probit regressions that use different measures of informal employment as the dependent variable establish that younger workers, males, workers with primary education or less, persons with low skills, workers in construction and trade and related services have a substantially higher likelihood of being informally employed. It is noteworthy that these drivers of informal employment dominate with nearly all definitions; only when we use firm size (5 employees or less) are the listed determinants not necessarily good predictors. For example, with the firm size definition females are more likely to be informally employed. From our probit estimates we draw two conclusions. First, the conjecture that the determination of informal employment is not robust needs to be qualified in that our estimations show that we do have robustness with all measures apart from the firm size measure. Second, firm size does not capture informal employment well, at least in an emerging transition economy like Russia.

### Impacts – Terrorism/Crime

#### Informal sector money transfer increases crime and terrorism

The Economist 1 [“Cheap and trusted: Homing in on networks of informal money transfers ,” The Economist, 11/22/2001. <http://www.economist.com/node/877145>] **AZ**

From a government's point of view, however, informal money networks are threatening, since they lie outside official channels that are regulated and taxed. Earlier this year, Pakistan's finance minister, Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibank executive, complained that only $1.2 billion of the $6 billion sent annually to Pakistan from overseas arrives through the banking system. Most of the rest, he said, makes its way in through hawala and other informal channels. Now that America is scrutinising money movements around the world and freezing accounts, more funds are entering Pakistan officially. By far the largest proportion of people who use informal networks are overseas workers remitting earnings to their families. Not only do they distrust official institutions; they also cannot afford them. Hawala dealers usually charge a commission of 1-2% for a transfer, and they might offer a better exchange rate than the official one. Moreover, they often arrange for funds to be delivered to people's homes, even in small villages. By contrast, Western Union, an official money-transfer service, charges $22 to send $150 from New York to Pakistan—a near-15% commission. Undoubtedly, criminals as well as overseas workers are using informal money-transfer systems. Historically, hawala networks have played a vital role in the smuggling of gold from Europe to India, through Dubai. According to Martin Comley at the National Criminal Intelligence Service in London, the use of hawala dealers in Britain by criminals has been rising in recent years. He notes that the operations of some dealers are now so large that they need to use the banking system to help them make transfers. The question for law-enforcement agencies is whether informal money-transfer networks are so permeated by illegal activities, including terrorism, that they should be shut down altogether. Tom Naylor, an expert in economic crime at McGill University in Montreal, says it is nonsense to think that informal remittance houses could handle shady money on the scale of the big, reputable banks.

### Impacts – Piracy

#### Informal sector causes piracy in Russia—empirics prove

Mattelart 12 [Tristan Mattelart, Professor of Communication at University of Paris, “Audiovisual Piracy, Informal Economy, and Cultural Globalization,” International Journal of Communication. 2012] AZ

It would be difficult to understand the scope of audiovisual piracy today in Russia and Bulgaria without taking into account the historical dimensions of the phenomenon. In their investigations carried out in these two countries, Kiriya and Dimitrova emphasize the decades of “clandestine cultural practices” developed during the Soviet era by populations to access, particularly through audio and videocassettes, forbidden Western products (Dimitrova, 2011; Kiriya, 2011, p. 243). After the fall of communist regimes in these two countries, the black market networks satisfied consumers’ cravings for Western cultural products, stirred by decades of banning. And in this continuity, piracy has emerged, from the early 1990s onwards, as a “widespread practice to fill the gaps of the new merchant system,” and to circumvent its logics of exclusion in the market of cultural products (Kiriya, 2011, p. 243). What these studies illustrate, then, is the “strong social demand” (Benchenna, 2011, p. 102) existing in these countries for pirate products—a social demand which tends to be disregarded by the reports written by the organizations defending the interests of copyright-based industries. In this respect, piracy of symbolic goods cannot be seen solely through the lens of a “criminal activity.” It is also intimately interwoven into the social, cultural, and political structures of the countries surveyed. Operating through the structures of informal economy, that interweaving extends into the economic fabric of these countries. Indeed, the investigations carried out in the framework of our project shed light on the existence of an informal economy of communications that, despite playing a central role in the circulation of cultural products at a world scale, has remained largely under-researched.

#### Informal sector furthers piracy in Russia—specific to transitioning countries

Mattelart 12 [Tristan Mattelart, Professor of Communication at University of Paris, “Audiovisual Piracy, Informal Economy, and Cultural Globalization,” International Journal of Communication. 2012] AZ

Kiriya (2011) shows how Russian sellers of pirated DVDs segment their products by offering different qualities of the same movies, at different prices, for attracting different customer categories. Various investigations carried out in the framework of our project also focus on the final link of the informal communication economy chain: the sellers of pirated products. Their profile is quite similar from one country to another: unemployed, qualified young men, for whom selling these products “is not an end in itself but a way to make ends meet,” as Benchenna notes about the Moroccan case. The barriers to entry in this informal business are low. One bag, “a small table, or a shelf” can be sufficient in Morocco, as in other countries, to sell pirated products (2011, p. 108). Bahi has devoted his research to the young people selling pirated products on the campus of Cocody, in Abidjan. Their activity expresses first, he explains, “their resourcefulness,” which gives shape to a form of small “entrepreneurship” resulting from “a survival strategy.” For them, the selling of pirated audiovisual products is also a means of recovering their “dignity,” for they “do not depend from the resources of their family anymore.” More, according to these young people, this activity is useful for Ivorian society as a whole: they feel that, in a period of crisis, they, in some way, “help their country fellows” (Bahi, 2011, pp. 177–178). Prospering in empty social spaces where public institutions, due to their lack of resources, are hardly present, their commerce can also be seen as “an act of bravado” against the state, and as a way of “contesting power and authority” (ibid., p. 171). In his investigation on the markets of pirated DVDs in Bogota, Gomez-Mejia focuses on the kind of “social interactions” that take place between the buyers and the sellers. Far from been described as “thieves”—as they tend to be in the reports commissioned by the major copyright-based industries—some of these sellers are identified as cultural brokers: They are portrayed as being “cinéphile dealers,” smugglers of a heteroclite cinematic culture, varying according to the potential customers (Gomez-Mejia, 2011, p. 206).

#### Piracy is cultural imperialism—turns oppression impacts

Mattelart 12 [Tristan Mattelart, Professor of Communication at University of Paris, “Audiovisual Piracy, Informal Economy, and Cultural Globalization,” International Journal of Communication. 2012] AZ

If piracy constitutes a major way of gaining access to cultural goods in the countries of the South or the East, it nevertheless raises serious challenges for their domestic cultural industries. Indeed, in countries whose cultural industries are often fragile, piracy poses a particularly acute problem. Revealingly, several studies analyzing the development of “cultural industries in the South” emphasize the “dangers [that] high piracy levels” represent for these industries (D’Almeida et al., 2004, p. 38; see also Sauvé, 2006). That problem is exacerbated by the fact that piracy results in an increased presence of the products of U.S. image industries in these territories. As a matter of fact, if piracy has caused the loss of potential revenues for Hollywood companies, it has also, to a large extent, enhanced the circulation of their contents in these markets—preparing, in a sense, the ground for future legal exports. On this point, too, the investigations carried out within the framework of our collective research project break with the agenda set by the reports sponsored by the main copyright-based industries. These reports present these industries as being piracy’s main victims. Yet, to say so is to forget that piracy is also, for these industries, an invaluable source of dissemination of their products at a world scale. As such, piracy could paradoxically become, in the medium or long term, an increased source of power for Hollywood companies. In this context, the networks of the globalization from below through which pirated goods circulate cannot be seen as spaces of resistance that would be opposed to the networks of the globalization from above: They are, like the latter, and not independently from them, inserted in a complex interplay of hegemonic relations at local, as well as at national and global levels.

### A2 Higher Wages Solve Piracy

#### Informal sector means that you can’t solve piracy—policies cause backlash

Mattelart 12 [Tristan Mattelart, Professor of Communication at University of Paris, “Audiovisual Piracy, Informal Economy, and Cultural Globalization,” International Journal of Communication. 2012] AZ

Most of the other investigations carried out within the framework of our collective project also consider the domestic policies implemented by the countries of the South or the East to combat or deal with piracy. From one country to another, the same heavily publicized police operations are conducted, aimed at convincing both global agencies and local publics of domestic authorities’ ability to solve the problem. Nevertheless, the ambiguities of these domestic policies must be underlined. Indeed, “the intimate involvement of the networks of the informal economy with the social, political and economic fabric” of the surveyed countries “obliges many governments to be extremely cautious” in applying their policies against piracy (Mattelart, 2009, p. 322). They are all the more cautious in their dealings with the informal economy of communication, as it constitutes for them, as explains Chéneau-Loquay, a nonnegligible “means of ensuring social peace: It gives employment to young people, produces value, and satisfies popular demands” (2011, p. 158).

## Case

### A2 Solvency

#### Absolute best possible study

Muravyev and Oshchepkov 13 [Alexander Muravyev and Aleksey Oshchepkov, Senior Research Associates. “Minimum Wages, Unemployment and Informality: Evidence from Panel Data on Russian Regions”, Institute for the Study of Labor, December 2013] AZ

The main strength of the paper is the use, for identification purposes, of the unique data with extremely large variation in the minimum wage as well as in labor market outcomes across 89 regions of Russia over 10 years. To our best knowledge, our study is the first that exploits this quasi-experimental setting in the analysis of labor market effects of the minimum wage. 2 Second, our data from post-transitional Russia, a country that combines essential features of developed and developing economies, are very well suited for studying a broad range of labor market outcomes, including not only unemployment among various sub-groups in the population, but also informal employment. Third, in contrast to many studies that focus on instantaneous effects of the minimum wage, we consider a more flexible estimation framework that allows for both advances and delays in the reaction of the labor market on minimum wage hikes. Last but not least, our study can be viewed as an indirect robustness test for the US results by Neumark and Wascher using a different setting.

#### Panel data shows minimum wage increases harm the most vulnerable groups and decrease employment overall

Muravyev and Oshchepkov 13 [Alexander Muravyev and Aleksey Oshchepkov, Senior Research Associates. “Minimum Wages, Unemployment and Informality: Evidence from Panel Data on Russian Regions”, Institute for the Study of Labor, December 2013] AZ

We start with the baseline specification estimated using full data from 2001 to 2010 but with different numbers of lags (which may capture delayed reaction of the labor market on changes in the minimum wage) and also allowing for one leading regressor (which may capture advance reaction of the labor market). In order to be able to compare models with different number of lags and leads using the conventional information criteria AIC and BIC, the number of observations is set the same in all regressions, 2686 (as in the model with four lagged regressors and one leading regressor). Table 3 (Panel A and Panel B) summarizes the results. The columns of the table correspond to the dependent variable chosen. The rows correspond to different sets of regressions. At the top of Panel A, we report the first set of results for regressions with no lag structure. Beneath these results, we provide estimates for regressions with one lag. Proceeding in the same fashion, we end up with regressions containing four lags. Note that for the reasons of space the table only shows the key coefficients of interest (on the relative minimum wage variable measured by the Kaitz index and its lags) as well as R-squared. The extensive set of time dummies as well as other controls, which are included in the regressions, are not reported in the table. Since the main purpose of the regressions in Table 3 is to provide evidence on the appropriate number of lags in the estimation, we discuss the table by blocks of results (horizontally) rather than by dependent variables (vertically). The first set of results shows no effect of the contemporaneous relative minimum wage on all labor market outcomes chosen. The coefficients are insignificant both economically and statistically. The second block of results, for the regressions with one lag of the Kaitz index, shows fairly large coefficients on the lagged value in the regressions with unemployment rate (among workers aged 15 to 72) and youth unemployment rate as dependent variables (columns 1 and 3, respectively). In the former regression, the coefficient on the lagged Kaitz is statistically significant at the ten percent level. In the latter regression, the coefficient is statistically significant at the one percent level. The signs and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are plausible. Higher relative minimum wages result in disemployment effects. In particular, an increase in the Kaitz ratio by one percentage point leads to an increase in the unemployment rate (among workers aged between 15 and 72) of 0.031 percentage points and in the youth unemployment rate by 0.120 percentage points. Interestingly, for workers aged 25 to 72 we observe no disemployment effect of the minimum wage. This suggest that the significant coefficient on the Kaitz index in the regression based on the sample of workers aged 15 to 72 is driven by young workers. Finally, we observe a positive effect of the minimum wage on informal employment, which is statistically significant at the five percent level for one of the two measures of informality chosen (column 5).

#### Minimum wage doesn’t solve poverty—no enforcement

RT 12 [Russia Today, Russian news network, “1.3 million Russians on minimum wage, far below poverty line,” RT, 11/27/12] AZ

Over a million Russians get a monthly wage of $148, most of them from the public sector, well below the $220 poverty line. 650,000 Russians out of 1.3 million living on the minimum wage work in the public sector, according to the country's Public Health and Social Development Ministry. The minimum wage is the lowest monthly wage employers may legally pay workers. It will be increased next year by 13% to 170 dollars a month, less than the minimum cost of living. According to the Russian statistics agency Rosstat 12.5% of Russians live below the poverty line. The minimum wage in Russia is much lower than in developed countries, the auditor FBK reports. According to its rating, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Belgium top the list with a minimum wage of over $1500 a month. Last in line is Kyrgyzstan where minimum wage is the equivalent of $24 a month. "In Russia, the minimum wage does not guarantee a decent standard of living for low-paid workers," Anna Bolsheva from the Global Labour University told Expert magazine. According to the Center for Labor Studies there are almost no private companies that pay salaries at the level of the minimum wage. "95% of cases are municipal enterprises related to education, science, health, etc.," Anna Lukyanova from the Center for Labor Studies says. The European standard for the minimum wage equates to earnings which are at least 60% of the average salary in the country, experts say. On the basis of these calculations, the minimum wage in the Russian Federation should be $515 a month.